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Summary
The incidence of recreational water–associated outbreaks in the United States has significantly 
increased, driven, at least in part, by outbreaks both caused by Cryptosporidium and associated 
with treated recreational water venues. Because of the parasite's extreme chlorine tolerance, 
transmission can occur even in well-maintained treated recreational water venues, (e.g., pools) and 
a focal cryptosporidiosis outbreak can evolve into a community-wide outbreak associated with 
multiple recreational water venues and settings (e.g., child care facilities). In August 2004 in 
Auglaize County, Ohio, multiple cryptosporidiosis cases were identified and anecdotally linked to 
Pool A. Within 5 days of the first case being reported, Pool A was hyperchlorinated to achieve 
99.9% Cryptosporidium inactivition. A case-control study was launched to epidemiologically 
ascertain the outbreak source 11 days later. A total of 150 confirmed and probable cases were 
identified; the temporal distribution of illness onset was peaked, indicating a point-source 
exposure. Cryptosporidiosis was significantly associated with swimming in Pool A (matched odds 
ratio 121.7, 95% confidence interval 27.4–∞) but not with another venue or setting. The findings 
of this investigation suggest that proactive implementation of control measures, when increased 
Cryptosporidium transmission is detected but before an outbreak source is epidemiologically 
ascertained, might prevent a focal cryptosporidiosis outbreak from evolving into a community-
wide outbreak.
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The incidence of recreational water–associated outbreaks in the United States has 
significantly increased since national surveillance began in 1978 [1]. This increase has been 
driven, at least in part, by outbreaks both caused by Cryptosporidium and associated with 
treated recreational water venues (e.g., pools). The first detected treated recreational water–
associated outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis were epidemiologically linked to a learner pool in 
Doncaster, United Kingdom and a school pool in Los Angeles, United States in 1988 [2-4]. 
During 2009–2010, Cryptosporidium caused 24 (68.6%) of 35 U.S. treated recreational 
water–associated outbreaks with an identified infectious aetiology [1].
Cryptosporidium is transmitted by the fecal-oral route and results from the ingestion of 
oocysts through the consumption of fecally contaminated food or water or through contact 
with an infected person or animal. Following ingestion the typical incubation period is 7 
days (range 1–12 days) [5]. Cryptosporidium is extremely chlorine-tolerant with inactivation 
taking 3.5–10.6 days at free chlorine levels typically mandated or recommended in the 
United States (i.e., 1–3 mg/L or ppm1)2 [6]. Thus, Cryptosporidium transmission can occur 
even in well-maintained treated recreational water venues, and a focal outbreak associated 
with one such venue can expand into a community-wide outbreak associated with additional 
recreational water venues or other settings (e.g., child care facilities) [7, 8].
There are many species within the genus Cryptosporidium, of which C. hominis and C. 
parvum cause >95% of human infections [9]. Identifying the Cryptosporidium species can 
provide key epidemiologic clues. For example, C. parvum can infect both humans and 
ruminants (e.g., pre-weaned calves), each with their own transmission cycle that intersects in 
zoonotic disease; C. hominis primarily exists in a human-to-human transmission cycle [10]. 
C. hominis and C. parvum are morphologically indistinguishable, thus molecular typing 
must be done to speciate and subtype isolates. The increasing use of molecular typing of 
Cryptosporidium spp. has helped elucidate the epidemiology of cryptosporidiosis (e.g., 
differentiating clusters during outbreak investigations) [11, 12].
Outbreak detection
On 9 August 2004, Ohio's Auglaize County Health Department (ACHD) was notified of a 
laboratory-confirmed case of diarrhoea caused by Cryptosporidium. After accessing the 
Ohio Disease Reporting System and noting multiple additional cryptosporidiosis cases in 
adjacent counties, ACHD contacted the health departments in neighbouring Mercer and 
Shelby Counties to ask if they had found any common exposures among their reported 
cases. Preliminary interviews revealed that several additional unreported cases of diarrhoea 
had occurred among Pool A's swim team members. Because this outbreak was detected a 
few days before a festival, with >9,000 anticipated attendees who could amplify 
transmission, an investigation with the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) and U.S. Centres 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was launched. The investigators aimed to prevent 
1pH 7.5, temperature 77°F (25°C)
2Free chlorine levels mandated or recommended in European countries are typically lower than those in the United States.
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further transmission; determine the magnitude of the outbreak; and identify risk factors for 
cryptosporidiosis in Auglaize, Mercer, and Shelby Counties.
To control transmission, prevention measures were proactively and concurrently undertaken 
in the tri-county area. Within 5 days after the first cases was reported, suspect Pool A was 
hyperchlorinated on 12 and 13 August [6]. Two neighbouring pools were also closed and 
hyperchlorinated on the same days as Pool A. All pools were immediately re-opened post-
hyperchlorination. Other control measures were implemented 2 days after the first case was 
reported to ACHD. These included conducting prevention outreach to child care facilities 
(e.g., banning all water play or swimming activities, such as any play or activities involving 
water tables, temporary inflatable or rigid fill-and-drain swimming pools and slides, or 
public pool visits) public schools, physician offices, medical facilities, and nursing homes 
and creating a press release for the local media to convey prevention messages to the public. 
Signage was also created for distribution to local pools reminding patrons not to swim while 
ill with diarrhoea and for those diagnosed with cryptosporidiosis for an additional 2 weeks 
after symptoms completely resolved3. Additional measures focused on the festival and 
included teaching proper handwashing technique to festival food handlers, instructing food 
handlers to refrain from food preparation if ill, placing signage in and around festival 
restrooms to encourage handwashing, and strategically locating handwashing stations. 
Informational packets on cryptosporidiosis and the importance of good hygiene practices 
(e.g., handwashing), especially when ill, were distributed to festival attendees.
METHODS
Case finding and case-control study
For this outbreak investigation, a confirmed case was defined as a resident of Auglaize, 
Mercer, or Shelby County, Ohio, who 1) had diarrhoea (i.e., ≥3 loose stools in a 24-hour 
period) during July–August 2004, 2) had laboratory-based evidence of Cryptosporidium 
infection, and 3) did not travel to South Bass Island, Ohio, where another cryptosporidiosis 
outbreak simultaneously occurred [13]. A probable case was defined as a resident of 
Auglaize, Mercer, or Shelby County, Ohio, who 1) met the above criteria but did not have 
laboratory-based evidence of infection and 2) was epidemiologically linked to a confirmed 
case. The tri-county health departments contacted healthcare providers (e.g., physicians and 
hospitals) in their respective jurisdictions to encourage testing of symptomatic persons and 
reporting of positive test results. Based on reports called into the tri-county health 
departments, a line list of case-patients was generated.
To identify community risk factors for cryptosporidiosis, a case-control study was 
conducted. The study protocol was institutionally reviewed and determined not to be human 
subjects research, as it was part of a public health response. A parent or guardian answered 
questions on behalf of a child <12 years of age; the parent's or guardian's permission was 
obtained prior to speaking with an assenting child >12 years of age. Case-patients thought to 
be the first in their respective household to become ill were recruited from the 
3Infected persons can shed Cryptosporidium oocysts for up to 60 days after complete symptom resolution; however, most stop 
shedding oocysts within the 2 weeks after complete symptom resolution [5].
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aforementioned line list. Prior to the start of the interview, the interviewer attempted to 
verify that the case-patient was in fact the first person in the household to become ill. Two 
controls, who reported no gastrointestinal illness during July–August 2004, were matched to 
each case-patient by age range (i.e., 0–<2 years, 2–<6 years, 6–<18 years, and ≥18 years) 
and county of residence. Area phone books were used to identify potential controls. A 
person in a randomly selected household listed on the first page of each section was 
recruited for the study. Subsequently, a person from every tenth listed household was 
recruited. Only one person per household was interviewed as a control.
Investigators administered a standardized questionnaire, to case-patients and controls, asking 
about exposures in the 2 weeks prior to the matched case-patient's date of illness onset. 
Questions about the following were included: food and drinking water consumption; 
recreational water, child care, household, farm, and animal exposures; attendance at events 
with >50 persons; and travel history. Because hypothesis-generating interviews indicated a 
common recreational water exposure among case-patients, detailed questions were asked 
about recreational water activities in general and at specific pools, including Pool A. 
Additionally, data were collected on the symptoms case-patients experienced and time lost 
from work and from daily activities due to illness. The case-control study was launched 25 
August, 16 days after the first case was reported to ACHD. All data analyses were 
performed using SAS, version 9.3 (SAS Institute Inc., USA). Odds ratios (ORs), 95% 
confidence intervals, and p-values were calculated using conditional logistic regression to 
account for matching.
Laboratory investigation
Stool testing for Cryptosporidium was requested for individuals who were experiencing 
diarrhoea or whose diarrhoea had resolved within the previous 2 weeks. Testing for 
Cryptosporidium was performed by ODH by direct immunofluorescent assay (DFA) and 
results were confirmed by DFA at CDC. Cryptosporidium isolates were subtyped at CDC 
using DNA sequence analysis [14]. Stool specimens from 25 initially identified case-
patients were tested by ODH to rule out bacterial and viral aetiologies of diarrhoeal illness.
Environmental health investigation
The environmental health investigation focused on Pool A, which consisted of a main pool 
and a wading pool and was anecdotally implicated early in the outbreak investigation. 
Maintenance records and daily attendance numbers were reviewed for the months of July 
and August. On 11 August 2004, 2 days after the first case was reported to ACHD, Pool A 
was closed and a private company took water samples from the wading pool and the deep 
and shallow ends of the main pool. These samples were processed by ODH using U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency Method 1622 [15]. The resulting immunomagnetic 
separation beads were sent to CDC for molecular analysis [16]. Additionally, aquatic staff 
were interviewed, using a standardized questionnaire asking about whether or not they had 
diarrhoea, their activities and duties at the pool, and pool patron behaviour observed during 
July–August 2004.
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A total of 150 confirmed and probable cases were identified. The temporal distribution of 
illness onset was peaked, indicating a point-source exposure (Figure). Among 63 case-
patients who were thought to be the first to become ill in their respective household, 55 
(87.3%) were successfully recruited to participate in the case-control study and matched 
with 105 controls. Of the 55 enrolled case-patients (median age 8.0 years; range 1.3–61 
years), 48 (87.3%) were children and 26 (47.3%) were male; reportedly none were 
immunocompromised. The most commonly reported symptoms were diarrhoea, tiredness/
fatigue, loss of appetite, and abdominal cramps (Table 1). Three (5.5%) case-patients 
reported being seen in an emergency department; two (3.6%) reported being hospitalized. 
Fifty (90.9%) case-patients reportedly experienced a median of 7 stools maximum in 24 
hours (range 3–25 stools maximum in 24 hours). Diarrhoea reportedly lasted a median of 6.5 
days (range 1–19 days). Of 52 case-patients4, 32 (61.5%) reported diarrhoea that went away 
for >1 days and then came backa median of 2 times (range 1–8 times) before complete 
resolution. Three (5.5%) case-patients reportedly continued recreational water activities 
while they had diarrhoea, and 10 (18.2%) case-patients reportedly participated in 
recreational water activities within the 2 weeks after their diarrhoea completely resolved.
Of seven adult case-patients, six (85.7%) reported not being able to perform daily activities 
for a median of 7.5 days (range 2–17 days); two of four (50%) employed adult case-patients 
reported missing work due to illness. Of 42 paediatric case-patients, 32 (76.2%) were 
reportedly not able to perform daily activities for a median of 3.0 days (range 1–18 days); 
parents or guardians of 29 (60.4%) of 48 paediatric case-patients reported not being able to 
perform daily activities due to their child's illness for a median of 3.0 days (range 1–14 
days). Of 32 employed parents or guardians of paediatric case-patients, 10 (31.3%) reported 
missing work due to their child's illness for a median of 2.5 days (range 1–14 days).
Multivariable Analysis—In bivariate analysis (Table 2), cryptosporidiosis was 
significantly associated with swimming in Pool A (matched odds ratio [mOR] 121.7, 95% 
confidence interval [CI] 27.4–∞)., <0.0001 Swimming in any other individual recreational 
water venue orwas not a significant risk factor for cryptosporidiosis n was childcare. Having 
an adult (mOR 5.4, 95% CI 1.6–23.0, P=0.004) and a child (mOR 41.2, 95% CI 6.7–>999, 
P<0.0001) household contact ill with diarrhoea in the 2 weeks prior to illness onset were 
also each significant risk factors for cryptosporidiosis. When case-patients who reported any 
ill household contacts in the 2 weeks prior to illness onset were excluded from the analysis, 
swimming in Pool A remained a significant risk factor (mOR 36.7, 95% CI 7.9–∞, 
P<0.0001) as did swimming in any swimming pool (mOR 15.3, 95% CI 3.1–∞, P=0.0012) 
or recreational water (mOR 141.0, 95% CI 2.2–∞, P=0.0073).
Swimming in a private/residential pool; consumption of any cider or juice; contact with a cat 
or dog, farm animal, or animal waste or manure were each significantly protective. More 
4Denominators vary due to missing, unknown, or refused values.
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than 95% (22/23) of controls who swam in a private/residential pool did not swim in Pool A. 
When the aforementioned protective factors were individually modelled as predictors along 
with swimming in Pool A, they remained protective but were no longer statistically 
significant.
Laboratory investigation
Twenty-eight stool specimens were positive for Cryptosporidium by DFA at CDC. The 
DNA of 18 (64.3%) isolates amplified. Molecular typing of 18 isolates identified 
Cryptosporidium hominis, subtype IdA15G1. Stool specimens from 25 of 63 (39.7%) initial 
case-patients were tested for the presence of bacterial and viral pathogens, of which 24 
(96.0%) were negative; one (4.0%) had no growth, including of normal intestinal flora, and 
thus was considered an invalid clinical specimen.
Environmental health investigation
The main pool had a spread finger layout; a diving well, water slide, children's slide, rain 
drop water feature, and zero-depth entry; and a capacity of 994,477 litres. Disinfection of the 
main pool was achieved through treatment with sodium hypochlorite (NaOCl) adjusted by 
automatic controllers; two sand filters5 provided a required flow rate of 2,071 litres per 
minute. The wading pool had a capacity of 11,708 litres. It had a separate circulation system 
and sand filter; it was also disinfected with NaOCl. The samples taken from the deep and 
shallow ends of the main pool were positive for Cryptosporidium spp. by real-time PCR, 
while the wading pool samples were negative. However, conventional PCR, which requires 
a longer segment of DNA to be amplified, was negative and therefore, molecular typing was 
not possible. A review of Pool A attendance records showed a peak in pool attendance on 2 
August (Figure), or 6 days prior to the illness onset peak in the epicurve as would be 
expected with cryptosporidiosis. Further breakdown of the types of patrons in attendance 
revealed a peak in attendance by pre-school–aged children on 2 August. During the pool 
inspection conducted on 18 August, Auglaize County environmental health specialists noted 
no violations.
Of 38 pool employees, 32 (84.2%) were interviewed. All interviewed pool employees were 
lifeguards. Eighteen (56.3%) were also swim instructors; 3 (9.4%) also worked as managers. 
The median age of interviewed employees was 17 years (range: 15–21 years). Eight (25.8%) 
of 31 employees reported having diarrhoea since 1 July 2004; two (25.0%) of the eight 
reported that they continued to go into the water or participated in other recreational water–
related activities in any pool while ill with diarrhoea. Four (50.0%) of the eight employees 
reported that they went into the water or participated in other recreational water–related 
activities in Pool A within the 2 weeks after their diarrhoea completely resolved. Eight 
(25.0%) of 32 reported observing mothers changing diapers in the area around the wading 
pool; four (13.3%) of 30 reported observing mothers changing diapers around the main pool. 
No employees reported observing mothers cleaning or rinsing their child's bottom in the 
wading or main pool. Fifteen (48.4%) of 31 employees reported faecal incidents in the main 
5Flocculants are not typically a part of pool operation in the United States. Sand filters alone do not efficiently remove 
Cryptosporidium from the water (i.e., removals are <0.19 log or 36%) [17]. Flocculants are typically part of pool operation in 
European countries.
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pool and 3 (10.0%) of 30 reported faecal incidents in the wading pool during July–August. 
Managers anecdotally reported that the majority of “babies” were in the main pool on a 
typical day.
DISCUSSION
This is the first U.S. recreational water–associated cryptosporidiosis outbreak for which a 
proactive public health response has been documented. The lack of transmission beyond 
Pool A suggests that such a proactive response might have prevented subsequent 
community-wide transmission to other recreational water venues or settings, despite the 
large festival. This outbreak followed a 2003 Kansas community-wide recreational water–
associated cryptosporidiosis outbreak, which affected >600 persons [18]. Lessons learned 
from the Kansas outbreak investigation were applied to this Ohio outbreak investigation, 
namely proactively implementing control measures — i.e., once an outbreak is suspected or 
an increase in cryptosporidiosis case reporting has been detected but before the case-control 
study was conducted; the data were analysed; and the outbreak source was 
epidemiologically ascertained. Unfortunately, this Ohio outbreak was followed by 
community-wide recreational water–associated cryptosporidiosis outbreaks in Utah in 2007 
and Texas in 2008, which each affected thousands, as well as Victoria, Australia in 2013 and 
Florida in 2014 [7, 19-21]. The ongoing occurrence of community-wide recreational water-
associated outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis in >10 years since this Ohio outbreak argues for 
the reporting of the proactive implementation of control measures and subsequent lack of 
community-wide transmission and provides an example for response to future recreational 
water-associated cryptosporidiosis outbreaks. .
Others who have investigated recreational water–associated outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis 
have also called for proactive response to these outbreaks [22, 23]. Both Coetzee et al. and 
McCann et al. advocate for rapid field epidemiology to direct implementation of control 
measures in response to recreational water–associated outbreaks of cryptosporidiosis. This 
recommendation fits the traditional model of field epidemiology [24]. However, delaying 
implementation of control measures, such as hyperchlorination of treated recreational water 
venues, can cause a focal cryptosporidiosis outbreak to evolve into a community-wide 
outbreak associated with multiple treated recreational water venues or other settings. This is 
because Cryptosporidium is extremely chlorine tolerant, and the free chlorine levels 
typically mandated or recommended for treated recreational water venues and other settings 
do not effectively inactivate the parasite. The pathway for a communitywide outbreak's 
characteristic transition from waterborne to person-to-person Cryptosporidium transmission 
is likely young children, who use treated recreational water and then transmit the parasite to 
caregivers in their household and child care facilities [7, 25, 26].
Since the aforementioned Kansas outbreak and this Ohio outbreak, the U.S. CDC has been 
recommending proactively implementing control measures once an increase in 
cryptosporidiosis reporting is detected or an outbreak is suspected, formally so since 2008 
[7, 27]. Accordingly, in the scenario reported by Coetzee et al., where an increase in 
cryptosporidiosis reporting was detected, CDC would have recommended hyperchlorinating 
any treated recreational water venue used by >2 case patients, if they are not all from the 
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same household. In the scenario reported by McCann et al., where a cluster of diarrheal 
illness was detected, CDC would have recommended hyperchlorinating the swim club pool 
as soon as Cryptosporidium was identified as the outbreak aetiology.
In Ohio, Pool A and two nearby pools were closed to swimmers, hyperchlorinated, and 
reopened all within 5 days of ACHD receiving its first report of an outbreak-associated case 
(Figure). Closing Pool A and nearby pools, which might have been used by the same 
swimmers, and hyperchlorinating the water, after samples from Pool A were taken for 
testing, did not interfere with the concurrent outbreak investigation and prevented further 
transmission at these pools. Reopening the pools immediately post-hyperchlorination 
potentially prevented those, who typically swim at these pools, from going to other 
recreational water venues and contaminating them with Cryptosporidium oocysts.
Because these extremely chlorine tolerant oocysts are not efficiently removed by sand filters 
typically used at U.S. treated recreational water venues (or in European venues with 
improper coagulant dosing) and because remediation options for untreated recreational 
water venue (e.g., lakes) are limited, swimmers, the Cryptosporidium oocyst reservoir, must 
be engaged in efforts to prevent contamination of recreational water in the first place and 
recontamination post-hyperchlorination[28]. While 98.2% of interviewed case-patients 
reported swimming in the 2 weeks before they became ill, 5.5% reported swimming while ill 
with diarrhoea. A previously reported study suggests that a healthy swimming education 
campaign, such as the one conducted in the days following the detection of this outbreak, 
might help prevent cryptosporidiosis outbreaks associated with recreational water [29]. 
Before the 2008 summer swim season and during the 2007 statewide recreational water–
associated cryptosporidiosis outbreak in Utah, local and state public health officials 
disseminated healthy swimming messages via the web, television advertisements, public 
service radio announcements, and posters at pools [7]. Healthy swimming messages were 
also targeted at schools, competitive water sports teams, and child care facilities. A 2009 
U.S. national surveyof an individual from >4,500 households found that Utah residents were 
significantly more likely to know that they should not swim while ill with diarrhoea than 
residents of other states (100% vs. 78.4%). No recreational water–associated outbreaks were 
detected in Utah during 2008–2011.
In contrast, 25% of pool employees reported entering the water or participating in other 
recreational water–related activities in any pool while ill with diarrhoea. Ill pool employees 
might have found it difficult to abstain from entering the water while performing work 
duties without admitting to being ill and then potentially losing wages or even work. An 
investigation of a waterpark-associated cryptosporidiosis outbreak found that illness onset 
peaked in employees before patrons and Cryptosporidium contamination of the water by 
employees could have led to the outbreak [30]. Thus, U.S. CDC recommends that the 
aquatics sector institute policies that allow employees to perform alternate duties that do not 
require entering the water while they are ill with diarrhoea. Such policies would be 
analogous to those in the food service sector that deter employees from handling food while 
ill with diarrhoea.
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This investigation had at least three limitations. First, the methods of this outbreak 
investigation cannot prove that proactively implementing control measures prevented a focal 
outbreak from evolving into a community-wide outbreak. However, the causation criteria of 
temporality, plausibility, and specificity are met and support this hypothesis. Second, recall 
bias among study participants might have been introduced into the study given that the 
questionnaire was administered a few weeks after the outbreak started. Case-patients might 
have been able to more accurately report their exposures during the 2 weeks before their 
illness than controls, who did not have an illness to enhance their memory of the time period 
of interest. Finally, 31 (56.3%) enrolled case-patients might not have been the first person in 
their respective household to become ill. This finding could be the result of questionnaire 
formatting or wording, leading to a misunderstanding on the part of interviewers or 
respondents. Regardless, Pool A remained significantly associated with illness, when data 
on these 31 case-patients and their corresponding controls were removed from analysis, 
despite the consequent decreased statistical power. Alternatively, while these 31 case-
patients might not have been the first in the household to become ill, they might have had 
the same exposure as the household member who truly became ill first (e.g., 49 [89.1%] of 
55 case-patients reported swimming in Pool A in the 2 weeks prior to illness onset).
The findings of this investigation suggest that a proactive public health response might 
prevent a focal cryptosporidiosis outbreak from expanding into a community-wide outbreak. 
However, such a proactive public health response is likely to be too late to prevent 
household transmission. Having ill household contacts has been identified as a risk factor for 
cryptosporidiosis in multiple studies[25, 26, 31]. While the proactive response to this 
outbreak provides a model for prevention of community-wide transmission of 
Cryptosporidium, transmission still potentially occurred within households and highlights 
the need for education regarding basic hygiene, such as handwashing after toileting, 
assisting others with toileting, or changing a diaper and before preparing food [32-34]. 
Given the prolonged nature of diarrhoea caused by Cryptosporidium, time lost from work 
and daily activities, and healthcare costs associated with emergency department visits and 
hospitalization, disseminating hygiene messages, which can also prevent the transmission of 
other enteric pathogens, before outbreaks occur and proactively implementing control 
measures when increased Cryptosporidium transmission is detected could be a worthwhile 
public health investment [35].
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Table 1







Loss of appetite 47/53 88.7




Body/Muscle aches 30/49 61.2
Bloating/Gas 29/49 59.2
Fever 32/54 59.3
Weight loss 24/46 52.2
Blood in stool 0/53 0
*
Denominator varies due to missing, unknown, or refused responses.
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Table 2
Case-control study: Bivariate conditional analysis of exposures—Auglaize County, Ohio, 2004







    Gender (%male) 26/55 47.3 45/98 45.9 1.1 (0.5–2.3)
    Age (years)
        0–<2 2/55 3.6 5/103 4.9
        2–<6 14/55 25.5 25/103 24.3
        6–<18 32/55 58.2 59/103 57.3
        ≥18 7/55 12.7 14/103 13.6
Human contact
    Adult household contact ill with diarrhoea 13/55 23.6 4/82 4.9
5.4 (1.6–23.0)
**
    Child household contact ill with diarrhoea 26/55 47.3 3/94 3.2
41.2 (6.7–>999)
***








    Swim or enter recreational water 54/55 98.2 62/104 59.6
43.3 (9.5–∞)
***
    Swim, wade in, or enter a swimming 53/55 96.4 53/103 51.5
48.4 (10.7–∞)
***
    Pool
        Pool A 49/55 89.1 6/103 5.8
121.7 (27.4–∞)
***




    Cat or dog 35/53 66.0 88/103 85.4
0.3 (0.1–0.8)
**
    Farm animal contact 12/50 24.0 43/98 43.9
0.4 (0.2–0.9)
**
    Animal waste/manure 11/49 22.4 41/99 41.4
0.4 (0.1–0.9)
**
Abbreviations: mOR, Matched odds ratio; CI, confidence interval.
*
In the 2 weeks before illness onset
†
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